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communities. However, behind both the government’s enthusiasm
and Collard et al’s criticism lie enduring public health dilemmas.
Below, I present five questions that may help readers consider
these issues as they relate to the Mulan SRA in particular, and to
incentives and obligations in general.
But first, we need a working definition. In the context of health,
let us say that “mutual obligation” means obligating people to adopt
healthy behaviours in return for a reward. While the Mulan agree-
ment incorporated a number of obligations and rewards (see Box),
here I focus on the obligation of parents and children to maintain
hygienic behaviours and the reward of a petrol bowser.
The key questions presented here refer only to obligations
placed on communities, rather than on governments. Further-
more, for the purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that
community members are in a position to fulfil the obligations (for
example, they have access to a functioning water supply).
Is the reward acceptable?
For many, this question hinges on the distinction between a right
and a privilege. Is it the right of a small, isolated community to be
provided with a petrol bowser by the government, or is it a
privilege? Most would agree that it is unfair to offer something as a
reward if it is a human or civil right, such as the provision of health
care. If it is a privilege, however, it may be considered acceptable to
use it as an incentive. This distinction is highlighted by “no school,
no pool” programs (in which children who do not attend school
may not use the community pool), which share features with
mutual obligation arrangements, and also use improved child
health as their rationale.4 There has been no prominent criticism of
the government providing swimming pools to remote commu-
nities conditionally, perhaps because swimming pools are seen as a
privilege, not a right.
In making these judgements, the special status of Indigenous
peoples must be taken into account. Their historical status as
Australia’s first peoples, their current position of extreme social
disadvantage, and their cultural distinctiveness all mean that the
government has special responsibilities towards them.5 For
instance, if it is shown that swimming pools hold long-term
benefits for child health, it may be argued that they should be
provided to remote communities as part of their right to health-
promoting infrastructure.
Is the obligatory behaviour acceptable?
Is it acceptable to ask parents to ensure their children are clean?
Some people would consider it an intrusion into the family unit,
an affront to personal autonomy, or dangerously close to the
paternalism of the assimilation era. Others would argue that the
grave situation of child health means that we should explore any
approach that can improve it, including addressing basic health
behaviours such as hygiene.
Draft agreement between the government and the 
residents of Mulan
Government
• The federal government will contribute $172 000 for the 
installation of fuel bowsers at Mulan.
• The Government of Western Australia will undertake to “monitor 
and review” the adequacy of health services in an area where 
trachoma rates are “arguably the worst in the world”.
Mulan Aboriginal Community
• The residents will:
? Ensure children shower daily and wash their faces twice a day;
? Ensure rubbish bins are at every house and are emptied twice 
weekly through the local work-for-the-dole scheme;
? Undertake household pest control four times a year; and
? Act to prevent petrol sniffing.
• Families and individuals will also make sure children attend school, 
crêche and the health clinic; and they will keep their homes clean 
and pay rents (to ensure the local council can afford pest control 
and repairs like plumbing).
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it can be shown that the community itself wants to dictate the
behaviour of community members, there may be less basis for
concern. For instance, when community councils enact alcohol
restrictions, obliging people not to drink, they are celebrated by
many as effective public health interventions.6
Is it acceptable that people adopt the behaviour in order 
to obtain the reward?
Public health science has long wrestled with the problem of
changing behaviour, including whether and when education,
incentives or compulsion are the best strategies.7 Economic incen-
tives and disincentives for healthy behaviour are generally accept-
able in some forms, such as taxes on tobacco and alcohol, and
health insurance rebates for spending on healthy activities such as
gym membership and yoga classes.
The question is whether it is acceptable for people to adopt
healthy behaviours in order to obtain the reward (a petrol bowser or
saving money), or whether sustainable behaviour change must
stem from genuine belief in the related health benefits. This
question is partly one of effectiveness: some argue that once a
behaviour is adopted it becomes habitual, regardless of why the
behaviour was adopted, while others question this reasoning.8 But
the question is also one of ethics: is the reward an inappropriate
inducement, despite the “healthiness” of the obligation? This
relates to the issue of autonomy I now turn to.
Do communities freely choose to participate?
This is the key issue for Collard and colleagues,3 and others for
whom community autonomy and self-determination are central
concerns. They suggest that the Mulan community was not “well
placed to judge whether the benefit they will get from a petrol
bowser will be worth the ‘price’ they have agreed to pay”,3
implying an element of exploitation or coercion in the govern-
ment’s approach. The proponents of the agreements, however,
argue they enhance community autonomy by allowing the com-
munity to deal directly with government, rather than through
intermediaries in multiple bureaucracies.9
Some would consider that the substantial power difference
between a small, isolated Aboriginal community and the Austral-
ian Government means that a community can never freely partici-
pate, even if community representatives truly believe they are
making an autonomous choice. Others think that to dismiss the
choices communities make as “false” is paternalistic.10
Can the arrangement be implemented?
It is concerning that there are no formal evaluative mechanisms
built into SRAs, as there are numerous questions surrounding the
implementation of these agreements. How would the cleanliness of
children be assessed? Would the government take the bowser
away if people stopped showering their children? If one family in
the community didn’t comply, would they be barred from using
the bowser? These are but a few of the immediate questions that
would need to be addressed in the implementation of the Mulan
SRA — questions that remain unanswered.
Will it improve health?
The public health literature indicates that incentives and obliga-
tions that promote healthy behaviours have a role in improving
health.7 The lack of attention to the implementation and evalua-
tion of these agreements on the government’s part suggests that
they, at least, are not taking the potential health benefits seriously.
A more serious approach to the potential health benefits of SRAs
would employ public health expertise and an evidence-based
approach. For instance, face-washing programs need to be inte-
grated with screening and treatment programs and environmental
health programs to have maximum impact on trachoma rates.11
It is also difficult to judge how genuinely Indigenous communi-
ties themselves are engaging with the health-related obligations of
SRAs. A pessimistic view might be that, to access much-needed
resources, communities are agreeing to obligations they have no
intention or ability to meet. This may have the inadvertent effect of
focusing the public health gaze on individual behaviours and
distracting us from necessary structural change. An optimistic view
would welcome the opportunity for community leaders to voice
their concerns about health and adopt novel health promotion
approaches, in a similar vein to alcohol restrictions and “no school,
no pool” policies. There may also be potential to use the agree-
ments to hold the government accountable for the provision of
basic infrastructure and services necessary for good health.
The political reality of SRAs is complex and fraught. However,
the current focus on incentives and obligations provides an
opportunity to reflect on the variety of methods available for
practising public health, and the factors that may affect the
application of SRAs in Indigenous contexts.
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